Milton

¶1p. 22 Hactenus ex natura sua cognoscitur Deus: nunc ex efficientia sua cognoscendus.

¶2EFFICIENTIA DEI est INTERNA, vel EXTERNA.

¶3INTERNA est quæ intra Deum terminatur: qualia sunt ejus decreta: Eph. i. 9. quod præstituerat in se.

¶4DECRETUM DEI est GENERALE vel SPECIALE.

¶5GENERALE EST QUO DEUS OMNIA AB ÆTERNO QUÆ QUIDEM VOLEBAT AUT FACTURUS IPSE ERAT, LIBERRIME, SAPIENTISSIME, SANCTISSIMEQUE DECREVIT.

¶6OMNIA QUÆ, &c. Eph. i. 11. qui agit omnia ex consilio voluntatis suæ. Nimirum quæ ipse quidem solus agit, et vult; non quæ agunt cæteri omnes, aut ipse cum iis quibus libere agendi naturam ac potestatem concessit: sic decrevit mundum creare; sic se non amplius terræ maledicturum, Gen. viii. 21.

¶7AB ÆTERNO. Act. xv. 28. nota sunt Deo a sæculo omnia opera ejus. 1 Cor. ii. 7. sapientiam occultam illam, quam præfinivit Deus ante sæcula.

¶8LIBERRIME, id est, non coactus, nulla necessitate impulsus, sed prout voluit. Eph. i. 11. ut supra. p. 23 {¶9} SAPIENTISSIME, id est, secundum perfectam rerum omnium creandarum præscientiam. Act. ii. 23. definito consilio et præcognitione Dei, et iv. 28. quæcunque manus tua et consilium tuum prædefiniit, ut fierent. et xv. 28. nota sunt Deo a sæculo omnia opera ejus. 1 Cor. ii. 7. sapientiam occultam illam, quam prædefinivit Deus. Eph. iii. 10, 11. multiformis illa sapientia Dei secundum præstitutum æternum.

¶10Qui igitur decretum seu voluntatem Dei ab ejus æterno consilio et præcognitione sejungunt, aut ordine prius ponunt, absurde faciunt; præcognitio enim Dei, mutato solum nomine, sapientia ejus est, sive illa rerum omnium idea quam, ut humanitus loquar, prius in mente habuit quam quicquam decerneret.

¶11Nihil itaque Deus decrevisse absolute censendus est, quod in potestate libere agentium reliquit: id quod scripturæ totius series ostendit. Gen. xix. 17. cum 21. ad montem fuge, ne perimaris. ecce, rationem habeo tui etiam in hac re; ut non subvertam civitatem istam quam dixisti. Exod. iii. 8. 17. inde descendi, ut liberem eum—, et educam eum in regionem bonam—, qui tamen in deserto periit. Decreverat etiam populum per Mosen educere: at illum Mosen occidisset, cap. iv. 24. nisi is statim circumcidisset filium. 1 Sam. ii. 30. dixeram quidem; at nunc absit mihi, ratione etiam adjecta, nam honorantes me honorabo. et xiii. 13, 14. jam certe stabilivisset regnum tuum Jehova; nunc autem regnum tuum non stabit. 2 Reg. xx. 1. dixerat Deus Ezechiam statim moriturum; quod non est factum tamen; ergo nec simpliciter decretum. Mors Josiæ præcise non est decreta; sed ipse non auscultavit verbis Neconis ex verbo Dei, monentis ne egrederetur. 2 Chron. xxxv. 22. Jer. xviii. 8, 9, 10. quo momento loquar de gente et regno me ædificaturum et plantaturum esse; si fecerit quod malum videtur in oculis meis, non auscultando voci meæ, vicissim pœnitebit me illius boni quod dixero me benefacturum ei: id est, rescindam decretum meum ob non servatam ab illo populo decreti conditionem. En regulam ab ipso Deo traditam! quo pacto ipsius decreta intelligi semper velit; cum intellecta nimirum decreti semper conditione. Jer. xxvi. 3. si forte auscultantes revertantur quisque a via sua mala ut p. 24 me pœniteat mali quod ego cogito facere illis propter pravitatem actionum illorum. Itaque ne excidium quidem Hierosolymæ absolute decreverat Deus. Jer. xxxviii. 17. &c. sic ait Jehova, si egressus fueris ad principes regis Babyloniæ, utique vivet anima tua et civitas hæc non comburetur igne—. Jonæ iii. 5. adhuc quadraginta dies, et subvertetur Nineve; at v. 11. cum vidit eos reversos esse, pœnituit eum: quamvis irato Jona, et id minime decere Deum sentiente. Act. xxvii. 24. 31. dono dedi tibi omnes: at nisi isti manserint in navi—: hic prolatam divinitus sententiam revocat Paulus: donum Paulo datum revocat Deus, nisi ipsi pro sua quisque virili parte sibimet consulant.

¶12Ex his itaque scripturæ locis et quæ istiusmodi occurrunt plurima, quorum in auctoritate nobis acquiescendum imprimis est, constat non omnia absolute a summo Deo decerni.

¶13Sin ad humanam rationem divina exigere decreta fas est, quoniam de iis multi multa in utramque partem subtilius fere quam solidius disputant, defendi hæc non absoluta decernendi ratio, ut sapientissima Deoque nullo modo indigna, humanis etiam argumentis breviter potest. Hæc enim decreta Dei, quæ supra attulimus, et quæ istiusmodi passim occurrunt, si absolute sine ullis conditionibus intellectis accipiantur, sibi contradicere videbitur Deus, et mutabilis esse.

¶14At inquiunt, in ejusmodi locis, cum finis tum etiam ipsa media prædestinabantur ad finem. Aiunt illi quidem; Scriptura nusquam ait: et hoc solum per se satis est, cur hanc regulam rejiciamus: et tamen hoc amplius accedit incommodi, quod omnem ex humanis rebus libertatem, omnem bene agendi conatum ac studium hac ratione funditus tollere necesse erit. Quid enim? si salutem mihi omnino decrevit Deus, quicquid ego contra fecero, non interibo. At medium quoque decrevit ad salutem ut faceres bene. Non possum ergo non facere aliquando bene, siquidem id quoque Deus decrevit: faciam interim quod libet: si nunquam benefecero nunquam destinatum fuisse me saluti comperero; et quicquid benefecissem operam fuisse perditurum. Plura vide infra capite sequenti. p. 25 {¶15} Nec juvat respondisse, immutabilitatis eam esse necessitatem, qua omnia decernuntur, aut infallibilitatis, sive præscientiæ, qua omnia præcognoscuntur, non coactionis; nam et de his duabus necessitatibus scholasticis infra satisfaciemus, et nullam interim agnoscimus necessitatem aliam, nisi quam Logica, id est, ratio docet; cum efficiens vel interna propensione sua unum quiddam determinate agit, quæ necessitas naturæ dicitur, ut cum ignis urit; vel externa vi cogitur efficere, quæ coactionis; qua quicquid agit efficiens, agit per accidens. Nulla igitur necessitas extrinsecus adveniens non aut determinat aut cogit; horum autem utrovis modo, tolli funditus libertatem non est obscurum. Quod si in Deo immutabilis quædam et interna necessitas bene agendi, aliunde non pendens, cum libertate summa potest consistere, quorum utraque in eadem natura divina ad idem fertur, non ideo sequitur de duabus disparatis naturis, nempe Dei et hominis, idem esse concedendum, ubi hinc externa immutabilitas, inde libertas interna adversari sibi possunt, et non idem velle. Verum nec in Deo necessitatem agendi ullam concedimus: sed esse quidem necessario Deum; decernere autem adeoque agere liberrime quicquid agit, scriptura ipsa testatur.

¶16At, inquiunt, necessitas divina sive causæ primæ, libertatem libere agentium non cogit. Respondeo: si non cogit, certe aut determinat, aut adjuvat, aut agit nihil: si determinat aut adjuvat, causa vel sola vel socia et principalis est earum rerum omnium quæ libere agentes bene aut male agunt: si nihil agit, causa omnino nulla est, nedum necessitas dicenda.

¶17Neque indignum quicquam affingitur Deo, si quos eventus, quas conditiones in potestate hominis liberas sitas esse Deus ipse voluit, eas ab arbitrio hominis pendere affirmemus; quandoquidem addixit Deus iis conditionibus decreta ipse sua, ut causas liberas ex ea libertate agere sineret, quam ipse iis indidit. Illud indignius Deo esset, verbo ostendi, re adimi libertatem homini, quæ necessitate quadam sophistica immutabilitatis videlicet aut infallibilitatis non coactionis, vel urgeatur, vel saltem obumbretur: id quod multos mortales in fraudem impulit, etiamque impellit. p. 26 {¶18} Quamquam proprie loquendo, nulla ab re alia divinum pendere dicimus consilium, nisi ab ipsa Dei sapientia, qua omnia perfecte apud se olim præcognovit, cujusmodi futura essent, qualemque suo tempore eventum habitura.

¶19At isti, inquis, rerum eventus, propter humanum arbitrium incerti, cum certissimo Dei decreto consistere qui possunt? scriptum est enim Psal. xxxiii. 11. consilium Jehovæ in sæculum stabit. idem Prov. xix. 21. Isa. xlvi. 10. Heb. vi. 17. immutabilitatem consilii sui. Respondeo primum; eventus rerum istos non esse Deo incertos, sed certissimos; nec tamen esse necessarios, ut infra videbimus: deinde, his omnibus in locis, stare dicitur divinum consilium contra vim omnem et consilium humanum; non contra libertatem arbitrii, quibus in rebus ipse Deus hominem suæ spontis fecerat, et ita facere ab æterno decreverat; alioqui enim decretum decreto repugnaret; et sequeretur id quod tu aliis objectas, mutabilem fieri Deum, dum arbitraria quæ is esse jusserat, tu necessaria reddis: sed non est mutabilis Deus, si præcise nihil decernit quod per libertatem homini decretam aliter se habere potest: mutabilis tum esset, tum consilium ejus non staret, si libertati semel decretæ per aliud decretum officeret, aut vel minimam necessitatis umbram induceret.

¶20Omnis igitur a libertate necessitas removenda est; et ne illa quidem immutabilitatis aut præscientiæ umbratica et externa admittenda. Si ulla manet necessitas, ut supra dixi, aut liberos determinat ad hoc unum, aut nolentes cogit, aut volentes adjuvat, aut agit nihil: si liberos determinat ad hoc unum, reddetur omnium actionum adeoque peccatorum suorum homo causa naturalis, et quasi in propensione ad peccandum conditus: si nolentes cogit, reddetur homo sub illa decreti coactione causa peccatorum tantum per accidens, Deus causa per se: si adjuvat, reddetur tamen cum homine Deus eorundem causa vel principalis vel socia: si agit denique nihil, necessitas nulla est, seque ipsa removet, agendo nihil. Decrevisse enim id Deum necessario, quod homini tamen scimus integrum fuisse, et immutabile id esse quod postea fieri aut non fieri potuit, impossibile omnino est. p. 27 {¶21} Quod itaque primo homini arbitrium erat, id ab æterno immutabile aut decretum absolute esse non poterat: et certe in potestate hominis aut nihil unquam fuit, aut si fuit quicquam, de eo simpliciter statuisse Deum non est dicendum.

¶22Quæ absurda hinc sequi aiunt, aut absurda non sunt, aut non sequuntur: quarundam enim rerum sive eventuum ideam in Deo aliunde advenire, neque impium est dictu neque ineptum: nam cum ab æterno statuisset Deus, hominem ita sui arbitrii futurum, ut posset labi vel non labi, idea certe eventus istius mali sive lapsus, in Deo aliunde erat; quod omnes fatentur.

¶23Neque hinc sequitur, temporale causam esse aut limitationem æterni: non enim temporale quidpiam, sed sapientia æterna divino consilio causam præbuit.

¶24Qualis itaque materia sive objectum divini consilii erat, nempe angelus vel homo libera voluntate impertiendus, qui posset labi, vel non labi, tale procul dubio decretum ipsum erat, ut omnia quæ exinde consecuta sunt mala, potuissent sequi, vel non sequi: si steteris, manebis; non steteris, ejiciere: si non comederis, vives; comederis, moriere.

¶25Perperam igitur, qui decreto absoluto libertatem agendi subjiciunt, decretum Dei causam esse ejus præscientiæ, et ordine præcedere, statuunt. Etenim si pro nostro more et captu loquendum de Deo est, præscisse prius, tum decrevisse, rationi magis consentaneum videtur; immo vero scripturæ, ipsique Deo; quippe qui ex præscientia, quod modo probavimus, sapientissime omnia decreverit.

¶26Voluntatem quidem Dei primam esse rerum causam, non negamus; præscientiam tamen et sapientiam ejus a voluntate non secernimus, multo minus posteriorem existimamus. Postremo, voluntas Dei non minus prima rerum omnium causa est, si quædam ab ipso arbitraria decernuntur, quam si omnia decernerentur necessaria. p. 28 {¶27} Ut multa paucis complectar, summatim sic se res habet, rationi summe consentanea. Decrevit Deus pro sua sapientia, angelos atque homines rationis, adeoque liberæ voluntatis compotes creare: prævidit simul quam illi in partem, sua integerrima libertate utentes, suopte arbitrio essent inclinaturi. Quid ergo? num hæc Dei providentia sive præscientia impositam esse iis necessitatem ullam dicemus? profecto non magis, quam si mortalium quisquam hoc idem prævidisset. Quod enim quivis mortalium certo prævidit eventurum, id non minus certo eveniet, quam quod Deus ipse prædixit. Sic prævidit Elisæus, quanta mala Rex Hazael illaturus Israelitis aliquot post annos esset, 2 Reg. viii. 12. Nec tamen id propter Elisæi præscientiam necessario evenisse quisquam affirmaverit: eventus enim ille nihilo minus ab arbitrio semper libero certissime nascetur: neque enim quicquam evenit quia Deus prævidit, sed unumquodque prævidit Deus, quia ex causis propriis ipsius decreto libere agentibus, ipsique notissimis, ita est unumquodque eventurum: et eventus quidem ille non est in Deo qui prævidet, sed in eo solo qui prævidetur. Cum igitur decretum divinum in libere agentes, ut supra demonstravimus, absolutum esse queat nullum, certe præscientia divina, cum nihilo plus agat in agentibus libere, quam præscientia hominis, id est, omnino nihil, ut quæ utrobique pariter actio sit immanens et in se terminetur, neque necessitatem ullam imponere per se potest, neque causa est omnino ulla liberarum actionum statuenda. Si statuitur, tollenda prorsus ex rebus inanissima vox ista libertas erit; non modo ex religione, verum etiam ex moribus, etiam ex adiaphoris: nihil non necessario fiet, cum nihil non præsciscat Deus.

¶28Ut aliquando succincte finiamus, tenendum est, Deum præscire quidem futura omnia, non autem omnia absolute decrevisse, ne peccata omnia Deo imputentur, Dæmonesque et quicunque impii culpa eximantur: tu hoc arripis satisque concessum putas quo evincas, aut Deum non omnia præscire, aut idcirco futura omnia necessario fore, quia Deus præscivit? Et certo quidem fore quæ Deus futura præviderit fateor, necessario non item: certo futura sunt, eo quod divina præscientia falli non potest; non necessario tamen, quia præscientia, cum actio tantum p. 29 immanens sit, in objectum nihil agit: quod igitur contingenter et libere futurum est, non ex præscientia Dei tandem producitur, sed ex causis suis libere agentibus quæ Deum non latent quam in partem sponte sua inclinaturæ sint; sic novit Adamum sua sponte lapsurum; certo igitur lapsurus erat; non necessario, quia sponte sua, contraria enim hæc duo sunt; sic præscivit Deus fore ut deficerent Israelitæ a vero cultu ad alienos Deos, Deut. xxxi. 16. Si propter hanc Dei præscientiam necessario erant defecturi, immerito sane minatus est se multa mala iis immissurum v. 17. frustra canticum illud scribi jusserit quod sibi testis loco esset contra filios Israelis, quippe necessario peccantes; verum præscientia Dei non magis quam illa Mosis v. 27. quicquam egit extra se; et testatur Deus, prænosse se eos impetu proprio, suaque sponte peccaturos, v. 16. surgens vero populus iste scortabitur, &c. et v. 18. quod averterit se ad Deos alienos: non ergo desciverunt Israelitæ quia Deus hoc prænovit, sed inde Deus prænovit quod ex causis sibi notis, quamvis libere agentes, certo tamen erant defecturi: v. 20. comedens saturabitur ac saginabitur: sed avertet se, &c. v. 21. me cognovisse figmentum ejus quid is sit facturus jam hodie antequam introducam eum in terram, &c. Ex his omnibus quæ dicta sunt satis tandem liquet neque decretum Dei neque præscientiam causas liberas necessitate ulla præpedire. Quod tamen nonnulli dum per fas nefasque oppugnare moliuntur, non dubitant Deum asseverare causam per se peccati et auctorem: hos equidem nisi per errorem non malitiose hoc dicere putarem blasphemorum omnium perditissimos crederem; quos refellere si coner, idem agam, ac si prolixe disputem Deum non esse Diabolum. Hactenus DECRETUM Dei GENERALE.

¶29DECRETUM Dei SPECIALE omnium primum ac præstantissimum est de FILIO suo: unde et PATER primario dicitur. Psal. ii. 7. decretum enarraturus sum; Jehova dixit mihi, Filius meus es, ego hodie genui te. Heb. i. 5. nam cui dixit unquam angelorum, Filius meus es, ego hodie genui te: ac rursum, Ego ero ei Pater, et ipse erit mihi Filius. 1 Pet. i. 19. 20. Christi, præcogniti quidem ante jacta mundi fundamenta. Isa. xlii. 1. electus meus, quem benigne accipit anima mea. 1 Pet. ii. 4. apud p. 30 Deum electus et pretiosus. Ex his cunctis locis apparet, Filium Dei decreto Patris fuisse genitum.

¶30DECRETUM Dei SPECIALE de ANGELIS diserte nusquam legitur: intelligitur autem ex 1 Tim. v. 21. electorum angelorum. Eph. i. 9, 10. mysterium voluntatis suæ, &c. ut recolligeret sub unum caput omnia in Christo, tum quæ in cœlis, &c.

¶1p. 30 Hitherto I have considered that knowledge of God which is to be obtained from his nature. That which is derived from his efficiency is the next subject of inquiry.

¶2The EFFICIENCY of GOD is either INTERNAL or EXTERNAL.

¶3The INTERNAL EFFICIENCY of God is that which is independent of all extraneous agency. Such are his decrees. Eph. i. 9. which he hath purposed in himself.

¶4–5The DECREES OF GOD are GENERAL or SPECIAL. GOD'S GENERAL DECREE is that WHEREBY HE HAS DECREED FROM ALL ETERNITY OF HIS OWN MOST FREE AND WISE AND HOLY PURPOSE, WHATEVER HE WILLED, OR WHATEVER HE WAS HIMSELF ABOUT TO DO.

¶6WHATEVER, &c. Eph. i. 11. who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will; which comprehends whatever he himself works or wills singly, not what is done by others, or by himself in co-operation with those to whom he has conceded the natural power of free agency. The creation of the world, and the removal of the curse from the ground, Gen. viii. 21. are among his sole decrees.

¶7FROM ALL ETERNITY. Acts xv. 18. known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world. 1 Cor. ii. 7. even the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world. p. 31 {¶8} OF HIS OWN MOST FREE—; that is, without controul, impelled by no necessity, but according to his own will. Eph. i. 11. as before.

¶9MOST WISE—; that is, according to his perfect foreknowledge of all things that were to be created. Acts ii. 23. by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. iv. 28. for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. xv. 18. known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world. 1 Cor. ii. 7. the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world. Eph. iii. 10, 11. the manifold wisdom of God, according to the eternal purpose which he purposed.

¶10There is an absurdity, therefore, in separating the decrees or will of the Deity from his eternal counsel and foreknowledge, or in giving them priority of order. For the foreknowledge of God is nothing but the wisdom of God, under another name, or that idea of every thing, which he had in his mind, to use the language of men, before he decreed anything.

¶11Thus it is to be understood that God decreed nothing absolutely, which he left in the power of free agents,—a doctrine which is shewn by the whole canon of Scripture.⁸ Gen. xix. 17, 21. escape to p. 32 the mountain, lest thou be consumed ...... see, I have accepted thee concerning this thing also, that I will not overthrow this city for the which thou hast spoken. Exod. iii. 8, 17. I am come down to deliver them .... and to bring them up unto a good land—though these very individuals actually perished in the wilderness. God also had determined to deliver his people by the hand of Moses, yet he would have killed that same Moses, Exod. iv. 24. if he had not immediately circumcised his son. 1 Sam. ii. 30. I said indeed ..... but now Jehovah saith, Be it far from me;—and the reason for this change is added,—for, them that honour me I will honour. xiii. 13, 14. now would Jehovah have established thy kingdom ..... but now thy kingdom shall not continue. Again, God had said, 2 Kings xx. 1. that Hezekiah should die immediately, which however did not happen, and therefore could not have been decreed without reservation. The death of Josiah was not decreed peremptorily, but he would not hearken to the voice of Necho when he warned him according to the word of the Lord, not to come out against him; 2 Chron. xxxv. 22. Again, Jer. xviii. 9, 10. at what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them,—that is, I will p. 33 rescind the decree, because that people hath not kept the condition on which the decree rested. Here then is a rule laid down by God himself, according to which he would always have his decrees understood,—namely, that regard should be paid to the conditionate terms attached to them. Jer. xxvi. 3. if so be they will hearken, and turn every man from his evil way, that I may repent me of the evil, which I purpose to do unto them because of the evil of their doings. So also God had not even decreed absolutely the burning of Jerusalem. Jer. xxxviii. 17, &c. thus saith Jehovah .... if thou wilt assuredly go forth unto the king of Babylon's princes, then thy soul shall live, and this city shall not be burned with fire. Jonah iii. 4. yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown—but it appears from the tenth verse, that when God saw that they turned from their evil way, he repented of his purpose, though Jonah was angry and thought the change unworthy of God. Acts xxvii. 24, 31. God hath given thee all them that sail with thee—and again—except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved, where Paul revokes the declaration he had previously made on the authority of God; or rather, God revokes the gift he had made to Paul, except on condition that they should consult for their own safety by their own personal exertions.⁹

¶12It appears, therefore, from these passages of Scripture, and from many others which occur of the same kind, to the paramount authority of which we must bow, that the most high God has not decreed all things absolutely.

¶13If, however, it be allowable to examine the divine decrees by the laws of human reason, since so many arguments have been maintained on this subject by controvertists on both sides with more of subtlety than p. 34 of solid argument, this theory of contingent decrees may be defended even on the principles of men, as most wise, and in no respect unworthy of the Deity. For if those decrees of God which have been referred to above, and such others of the same class as occur perpetually, were to be understood in an absolute sense, without any implied conditions, God would contradict himself, and appear inconsistent.

¶14It is argued, however, that in such instances not only was the ultimate purpose predestinated, but even the means themselves were predestinated with a view to it. So indeed it is asserted, but Scripture nowhere confirms the rule, which alone would be a sufficient reason for rejecting it. But it is also attended by this additional inconvenience, that it would entirely take away from human affairs all liberty of action, all endeavour and desire to do right. For the course of argument would be of this kind—If God have at all events decreed my salvation, whatever I may do against it, I shall not perish. But God has also decreed as the means of salvation that you should do rightly. I cannot, therefore, but do rightly at some time or other, since God has decreed that also,—in the mean time I will act as I please; if I never do rightly, it will be seen that I was never predestinated to salvation, and that whatever good I might have done would have been to no purpose. See more on this subject in the following Chapter.

¶15Nor is it sufficient to affirm in reply, that the kind of necessity intended is not compulsory, but a necessity arising from the immutability of God, whereby all things are decreed, or a necessity arising from his infallibility or prescience, whereby all things are foreknown. I shall satisfactorily dispose in another place of these two alleged species of necessity recognized by the schools:¹ in the mean time no other law p. 35 of necessity can be admitted than what logic, or in other words, what sound reason teaches; that is to say, when the efficient either causes some determinate and uniform effect by its own inherent propensity, as for example, when fire burns, which kind is denominated physical necessity; or when the efficient is compelled by some extraneous force to operate the effect, which is called compulsory necessity, and in the latter case, whatever effect the efficient produces, it produces per accidens.² Now any necessity arising from external causes influences the agent either determinately or compulsorily; and it is apparent that in either alternative his liberty would be wholly annihilated. But though a certain immutable and internal necessity of acting right, independent of all extraneous influence whatever, may exist in God conjointly with the most perfect liberty, both which principles in the same divine nature tend to the same point, it does not therefore follow that the same thing can be conceded with regard to two different natures, as the nature of God and the nature p. 36 of man, in which case the external immutability of one party may be in opposition to the internal liberty of the other, and may prevent unity of will. Nor is it admitted that the actions of God are in themselves necessary, but only that he has a necessary existence; for Scripture itself testifies that his decrees, and therefore his actions, of what kind soever they be, are perfectly free.³

¶16But it is objected that no constraint is put upon the liberty of free agents by divine necessity or first causes. I answer,—if it do not constrain, it either determines, or co-operates, or is wholly inefficient. If it determine or co-operate, it is either the sole or the joint and principal cause of all the actions, whether good or bad, of free agents. If it be wholly inefficient, it cannot be called a cause in any sense, much less can it be termed necessity.

¶17Nor do we imagine anything unworthy of God, when we assert that those conditional events depend on the human will, which God himself has chosen to place at the free disposal of man; since the Deity purposely framed his own decrees with reference to particular circumstances, in order that he might permit free causes to act conformably to that liberty with which he had endued them. On the contrary, it would be much more unworthy of God, that man should nominally enjoy a liberty of which he was virtually deprived, which would be the case were that liberty to be oppressed or even obscured under the pretext of some sophistical necessity of immutability or infallibility, though not of compulsion,—a notion which has led, and still continues to lead many individuals into error.

¶18However, properly speaking, the divine counsels can be said to depend on nothing, but on the wisdom of God himself, whereby he perfectly foreknew in his own mind from the beginning what would p. 37 be the nature and event of every future occurrence when its appointed season should arrive.

¶19But it is asked how events, which are uncertain, inasmuch as they depend on the human will, can harmonize with the decrees of God, which are immutably fixed?⁴ for it is written, Psal. xxxiii. 11. the counsel of Jehovah standeth for ever. See also Prov. xix. 21. and Isai. xlvi. 10. Heb. vi. 17. the immutability of his counsel. To this objection it may be answered, first, that to God the issue of events is not uncertain, but foreknown with the utmost certainty, though they be not decreed necessarily, as will appear afterwards.—Secondly, in all the passages referred to, the divine counsel is said to stand against all human power and counsel, but not against the liberty of will with regard to such things as God himself had placed at man's disposal, and had determined so to place from all eternity. For otherwise one of God's decrees would be in direct opposition to another, and that very consequence would ensue which the objector imputes to the doctrine of his opponents, namely, that by considering those things as necessary which the Deity had left to the uncontrouled decision of man, God would be rendered mutable. But God is not mutable, so long as he decrees nothing absolutely which could happen otherwise through the liberty assigned to man; whereas he would then be mutable, then his counsel would not stand, if he were to obstruct by another decree that liberty which he had already decreed, or were to darken it with the least shadow of necessity.⁵ p. 38 {¶20} It follows, therefore, that the liberty of man must be considered entirely independent of necessity,⁶ and no admission can be made in favour of that modification of the principle which is founded on the doctrine of God's immutability and prescience. If there be any necessity at all, as has been stated before, it either determines free agents to a particular line of conduct, or it constrains them against their will, or it co-operates with them in conjunction with their will, or it is altogether inoperative. If it determine free agents to a particular line of conduct, man will be rendered the natural cause of all his actions, and consequently of his sins, and formed as it were with an inclination for sinning. If it constrain them against their will, man who is subject to this compulsory decree will be rendered the cause of sins only per accidens, God being the cause of sins per se. If it co-operate with them in conjunction with their will, then God becomes either the principal or the joint cause of sins with man. If finally it be altogether inoperative, there is no such thing as necessity, it virtually destroys itself by being without operation. For it is wholly impossible, that God should have decreed necessarily what we know at the same time to be in the power of man; or that that should be immutable which it remains for subsequent contingent circumstances either to fulfil or frustrate.

¶21Whatever, therefore, was left to the free will of our first parents, could not have been decreed immutably or absolutely from all eternity; and questionless, either nothing was ever placed in man's power, or if it were, God cannot be said to have determined finally respecting it without reference to possible contingencies.

¶22If it be objected, that this doctrine leads to absurd consequences, we reply, either the consequences are not absurd, or they are not the consequences of the doctrine. For it is neither impious nor absurd to say, that the idea of certain things or events might be suggested to p. 39 God from some extraneous source; for since God had determined from all eternity, that man should so far be a free agent, that it remained with himself to decide whether he would stand or fall,⁷ the idea of that evil event, or of the fall of man, was suggested to God from an extraneous source,—a truth which all confess.

¶23Nor does it follow from hence, that what is merely temporal becomes the cause of, or a restriction upon what is eternal, for it was not any thing temporal, but the wisdom of the eternal mind that gave occasion for framing the divine counsel.

¶24Whatever therefore was the subject of the divine counsel, whether man or angel^8-2 who was to be gifted with free will, so that his fall might depend upon his own volition, such without doubt was the nature of the decree itself, so that all the evil consequences which ensued were contingent upon man's will; wherefore the covenant stood thus— p. 40 if thou remain faithful, thou shalt abide in Paradise; if thou fall, thou shalt be cast out: if thou dost not eat the forbidden fruit, thou shalt live; if thou eat, thou shalt die.^9-2

¶25Hence, those who contend that the liberty of actions is subject to an absolute decree, erroneously conclude that the decree of God is the cause of his foreknowledge, and antecedent in order of time.^1-2 If we must apply to God a phraseology borrowed from our own habits and understanding, that his decrees should have been the consequence of his foreknowledge seems more agreeable to reason, as well as to Scripture, and to the nature of God himself, who, as has just been proved, decreed every thing according to his infinite wisdom by virtue of his foreknowledge.

¶26It is not intended to deny that the will of God is the first cause of all things, but we do not separate his prescience and wisdom from his will, much less do we think them subsequent to the latter in point of time. Finally, the will of God is not less the universal first cause, because he has himself decreed that some things should be left to our own free will, than if each particular event had been decreed necessarily.

¶27To comprehend the whole matter in a few words, the sum of the argument may be thus stated in strict conformity with reason. God of his wisdom determined to create men and angels reasonable beings,^2-2 and therefore free agents; at the same time he foresaw which way the bias of their will would incline, in the exercise of their own p. 41 uncontrouled liberty.^3-2 What then? shall we say that this foresight or foreknowledge on the part of God imposed on them the necessity of acting in any definite way? No more than if the future event had been foreseen by any human being. For what any human being has foreseen as certain to happen, will not less certainly happen than what God himself has predicted. Thus Elisha foresaw how much evil Hazael would bring upon the children of Israel in the course of a few years, 2 Kings viii. 12. Yet no one would affirm that the evil took place necessarily on account of the foreknowledge of Elisha; for had he never foreknown it, the event would have occurred with equal certainty, through the free will of the agent. So neither does any thing happen because God has foreseen it; but he foresees the event of every action, because he is acquainted with their natural causes, which, in pursuance of his own decree, are left at liberty to exert their legitimate influence. Consequently the issue does not depend on God who foresees it, but on him alone who is the object of his foresight. Since therefore, as has before been shown, there can be no absolute decree of God regarding free agents, undoubtedly the prescience of the Deity (which can no more bias free agents than the prescience of man, that is, not at all, since the action in both cases is intransitive, and has no external influence,) can neither impose any necessity of itself, nor can it be considered at all the cause of free actions. If it be so considered, the very name of liberty must be altogether abolished as an unmeaning sound; and that not only in matters of religion, but even in questions of morality and indifferent things. There can be nothing but what will happen necessarily, since there is nothing but what is foreknown by God.

¶28That this long discussion may be at length concluded by a brief summary of the whole matter, we must hold that God foreknows all p. 42 future events, but that he has not decreed them all absolutely: lest all sin should be imputed to the Deity, and evil spirits and wicked men should be exempted from blame.^4-2 Does my opponent avail himself of this, and think the concession enough to prove either that God does not foreknow every thing, or that all future events must therefore happen necessarily, because God has foreknown them? I allow that future events which God has foreseen, will happen certainly, but not of necessity. They will happen certainly, because the divine prescience cannot be deceived, but they will not happen necessarily, because prescience can have no influence on the object foreknown, inasmuch as it is only an intransitive action. What therefore is to happen according to contingency and the free will of man, is not the effect of God's prescience, but is produced by the free agency of its own natural causes, the future spontaneous inclination of which is perfectly known to God. Thus God foreknew that Adam would fall of his own free will; his fall therefore was certain, but not necessary, since it proceeded from his own free will, which is incompatible with necessity.^5-2 Thus too God foreknew that the Israelites would revolt from the true worship to strange gods, Deut. xxxi. 16. If they were to be led to revolt necessarily on account of this prescience on the part of God, it was unjust to threaten them with the many evils which he was about to send upon them, ver. 17. it would have been to no purpose that a song was ordered to be written, which should be a witness for him against the children of Israel, because their sin would have been of necessity. But the prescience of God, like that of Moses, v. 27. had no extraneous influence, and God testifies, v. 16. that he foreknew they would sin from their own voluntary impulse, and of their own accord,—this people will rise up, &c. and v. 18. I will surely hide my face in that day .... in that they are turned unto other p. 43 gods. Now the revolt of the Israelites which subsequently took place, was not the consequence of God's foreknowledge of that event, but God foreknew that, although they were free agents, they would certainly revolt, owing to causes with which he was well acquainted. v. 20, 21. when they shall have eaten and filled themselves, and waxen fat, then will they turn unto other gods ...... I know their imagination which they go about, even now before I have brought them into the land which I sware.

¶28 cont.From what has been said it is sufficiently evident, that free causes are not impeded by any law of necessity arising from the decrees or prescience of God. There are some who in their zeal to oppose this doctrine, do not hesitate even to assert that God is himself the cause and origin of sin. Such men, if they are not to be looked upon as misguided rather than mischievous, should be ranked among the most abandoned of all blasphemers. An attempt to refute them, would be nothing more than an argument to prove that God was not the evil spirit.

¶29Thus far of the GENERAL DECREE of God. Of his SPECIAL DECREES the first and most important is that which regards his SON, and from which he primarily derives his name of FATHER. Psal. ii. 7. I will declare the decree: Jehovah hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Heb. i. 5. unto which of the angels said he at any time, Thou art my son, this day have I begotten thee? And again, I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son. 1 Pet. i. 19, 20. Christ ..... who verily was fore-ordained before the foundation of the world. Isai. xlii. 1. mine elect, in whom my soul delighteth. 1 Pet. ii. 4. chosen of God, and precious. From all these passages it appears that the Son of God was begotten by the decree of the Father.

¶30There is no express mention made of any SPECIAL DECREE respecting THE ANGELS, but its existence seems to be implied, 1 Tim. v. 21. the elect angels. Eph. i. 9, 10. the mystery of his will ..... that he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth.